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Models of Counterterrorism

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1.

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1. Executive Summary

The goal of our collaboration is to understand organizational and operational aspects of terrorist groups. The theory of terrorist organizations has not been well developed or updated. Tight groups seem to be the organizational forms that pose the greatest threat domestically—since they have the ability to operate in generally unsupportive environments. This has homeland security implications for defensive counterterrorism (CT), such as profiling and predicting threats. The club concept is one way of modeling tight networks. It yields testable implications for observables across multiple datasets. The club approach to understanding terrorist organizations also shifts the focus of offensive CT to a) seeking organizational weaknesses, and b) providing alternatives to benign services provided by clubs. This insight has been endorsed by many of the military practitioners we’ve consulted with who deal regularly with terrorist organizations. The club approach also helps predict what type of terrorist organizations can pose which types of threats to homeland security, allowing both offensive and defensive action to be optimized.

The “hearts and minds” model complements the club model by distinguishing between insights in CT from Iraq that are relevant to homeland security and insights from counterinsurgency (COIN), as opposed to CT, that are not. For instance, DHS need be concerned with suicide attacks emanating from homegrown or foreign terrorists, but not with IEDs, as the latter require a level of community acquiescence that exists in parts of Iraq but not in the US. Our overall goal is to test the applicability of clubs vs. “hearts and minds” theories in varied contexts and draw out implications for predicting domestic threats.

Ultimately, our goal is to generate research results that translate into better prepared DHS employees and improved CT policies.

In the 10 months since funding arrived we have made considerable progress on multiple projects. (Two parallel projects at the START Center at the University of Maryland were approved as part of the original collaborative proposal but subsequently not funded.)

We begin with a brief description of each ongoing project, findings to date, and relevant conclusions.

- **Rational Peasants:** This study seeks to develop the “rational peasant” (or “hearts and minds”) and club models of insurgency and terrorism through a combination of rational choice modeling and testing using data from Iraq. The project has explored the related literatures in criminology, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, industrial organization and political development to develop a robust version of these two modeling approaches. To test the models, we use data on international terrorism, including data that the U.S. military has shared with us on attacks in Iraq. We have developed a refutable series of hypotheses are currently in the process of analyzing the Iraq data for evidence indicating hypotheses validity.

  Results so far weight heavily in favor of a “hearts and minds” model of insurgent organizations in Iraq. We find that, when appropriately deployed, development programs are violence-reducing, in a manner consistent with conventional counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. The extent to which those programs also reduce violence due to clubs is a current topic of investigation. That is critical to understanding whether organizations active in Iraq pose a threat to the U.S. in the homeland. Importantly, in this analysis we focus not on stated intentions of terrorist organizations but on their demonstrated capacity.

- **Expert Survey:** This study seeks to identify patterns of resource expenditure of non-state violent actors on nonviolent activities. The study is cross-national. It seeks to fill a gap in the
study of terrorist organizations –expenditure data for a diverse set of clandestine groups is non-existent. For this reason, the researchers are conducting a survey of group and area experts knowledgeable about certain violent organizations. The survey answers will be combined in a dataset on resource expenditure which will be analyzed to assess statistical relationships between expenditures, violent activities, and counter insurgency and counter terrorism measures. At this point, surveys are in the process of being administered and we are processing preliminary results. Once processed, the results from this work will complement our understanding of the which groups operate adhering to a “hearts and minds” framework and which to a club model. This, as stated, has vital implications for which groups pose a threat inside the US and how those groups that do pose a threat may use violence.

- **Clubs in Prisons:** Terrorist groups have used and continue to use prisons to their advantage; nonetheless this remains a vastly understudied aspect of their behavior in the academic literature. Comparative analysis of how terrorist organizations have used prisons thus has the potential to provide important new insights for counterterrorism policy. In ongoing work, UC Berkeley graduate student Benjamin Lessing has been conducting research on the world’s most fearsome prison gang, the Primeiro Comando do Capital (PCC) of Brazil, an ally and ideological heir of Rio de Janeiro’s infamous Comando Vermelho (CV), also born as a prison gang. Both groups have repeatedly employed terror tactics, including the bombing of public buildings, subways and city busses, to create panic among residents and wrest concessions from officials. In terms of resources accumulated and tactics developed and implemented, there are no better cases to highlight the threats posed by the activity of armed groups within prisons.

- **Drivers of Militancy:** This study seeks to develop our understanding of the factors that drive support for Islamist militancy overseas. In a “hearts and minds” conflict against conventional insurgents, the attitudes of noncombatants to militants are important in gauging the ability of violent extremists to organize in a given area. This project conducted a survey in Pakistan, which was chosen because of the centrality of Pakistan in almost all recent acts of Islamist terrorism in Western countries.

  The survey is complete and results are now being analyzed. Preliminary results indicate success at finding a method of measuring attitudes toward militancy without endangering subjects or incurring biases. They show regional variation across Pakistan in support for militancy, with support for militant organizations the lowest in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in Baluchistan, where militants are most active. Religiosity, income and support for core democratic values have predictions which refute simple models of terrorist mobilization, as explained below.

- **Terrorist Risk Factors:** One of the challenges of research on terrorism is to remain rooted in theoretically relevant data collection while simultaneously retaining contact with the needs of practitioners fighting a set of actors worldwide. Our approach to that challenge has been to partner with Gary Shiffman of CPASS, a DHS veteran who specializes in the economics of counterterrorism. Gary tracks the activity of all of our projects, including those funded by other sources (currently in Afghanistan, Northern Ireland and the Southern Philippines) and our ongoing development of theory, with an eye to translation to the immediate needs of DHS.

  That relationship has grown into the Terrorist Risk Factors (TRF) project, which, since its launch in the Spring, has produced a short concept paper and an active panel discussion with policymakers and practitioners.
2. Research Accomplishments

2.1. Rational Peasant Project (Berman and Shapiro)

a. The project began the reporting period by completing an NBER working paper titled “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought” which for the first time used data from Iraq to evaluate the effects of reconstruction efforts on violence levels. That research is important in analyzing the forms and vulnerabilities of insurgent and/or terrorist organizations in a conventional “hearts and minds” insurgency.

Following the informal literature and US military doctrine, we model insurgency as a three way contest between rebels seeking political change through violence, a government seeking to minimize violence through some combination of service provision and hard (offensive) counterinsurgency, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents with government forces. This is the first formal model of conventional COIN doctrine that we know of. The model is specific enough to allow parameter estimates that reveal the effect of benign activity on levels of violence, and the extent to which diminishing returns may set in if substitutes for those benign services exist already. Formal modeling also allows the analytical distinctions between a conventional insurgent organization and a club to be investigated.

We test the model using new data from the Iraq war. We combine a geo-spatial indicator of violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces (SIGACTs), reconstruction spending, and community characteristics including measures of social cohesion, sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments. Our results support the theory’s predictions: counterinsurgents are most generous with government services in locations where they expect violence; improved service provision has reduced insurgent violence since the summer of 2007; and the violence-reducing effect of service provision varies predictably across communities.

During the ensuing year we have absorbed updated data on incidents in Iraq in the first half of 2008. We also refined the data on development programs, and submitted that paper twice for publication. The revised version now shows that the post-“surge” results on the violence-reducing effects of service provision are statistically stronger and remain stable in 2008.

That project is now embarking on an investigation of the effects of particular types of reconstruction spending. We hope that these will provide information on the type of enemy engaged. The theory of clubs predicts that reconstruction spending should only be violence reducing if it competes directly with the club in provision of a given service. Moreover, since clubs specialize in high-casualty attacks that do not leak information, such as suicide attacks, we can measure the effect of reconstruction spending on reducing those particular types of violence. If it is ineffective then that is evidence of organizations with club characteristics, which present a more grave danger to all, including domestic targets.

b. Berman published a book with the MIT Press. “Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism,” in October 2009. Though published by an academic press, and based on academic research, it is aimed at the non-technical reader and policymaker—with the purpose of explaining the economics of religious radicalism and religious terrorism to the general public. It includes several results based on DHS-funded work that Berman completed in 2008 with David Laitin—laying out the club model in plain English and explaining the empirical support for that model, in both benign and violent settings. The book received very strong reviews from leading academics recommending it to policymakers and the general public. The New Scientist wrote “Those whose job is to protect citizens from such attacks should note his conclusion…” (11/25/09).
c. The project completed an NBER working paper titled “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines.” That paper uses two types of incident data from Iraq and incident reports from the Philippines, combined with data from unemployment surveys, to ascertain to what extent lowering unemployment rates inhibits the ability of insurgent and terrorist organizations to attack government (and coalition) forces. That analysis is important because it speaks to the “opportunity-cost” theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in places with active insurgencies. We test that prediction on insurgencies in Iraq and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians. Contrary to the predictions of opportunity-cost theory, we find a robust negative correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces and no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. That paper is now submitted for publication.

2.2. Expert Survey (Berman, Laitin, Asal, Heger)

The study gathers information on organizational expenditures, most specifically those expenditures related to the distribution of goods and services. We use data on violence activities and expert surveys with anchoring vignettes to measure the two independent variables: (1) whether groups control territory; and (2) the extent to which they operate as a club. To measure the dependent variable, the mix of tactics, we use information on attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Since the pre-coded fields in the GTD do not map perfectly into the variation in tactics we seek to explain, we recode a random sample of incidents and re-run the analysis on that sample.

We are using an expert survey in order to gather information not readily available about clandestine organizations. Because judgments from experts across regions are difficult to calibrate, we ask experts two hypothetical questions which serve as “anchoring vignettes”. (On the purposes of these vignettes, please see http://gking.harvard.edu/vign/.) After the vignettes the survey-takers are asked specific questions about groups that they indicate a having some expertise in. Finally, individuals are asked to provide any comments on the survey instrument and to provide names of any individuals that they think might be qualified to answer our survey.

The experts who respond to the survey have been identified through our growing network of contacts in the academic and practitioner communities. We also draw on the CPASS and START networks for relevant expertise. This expert survey should become an important, open source, resource for other researchers.

This project was funded in the previous grant year, when we developed the survey instrument put it through a series of tests for feedback. We modified the survey based on the feedback to improve the quality of responses. After the initial testing stage was complete, we launched the survey. The survey is web based and has been generally well received. Our principal problem is in identifying experts who are willing to put time into the survey. We have about 30 responses so far.

Using responses we have thus far, we began developing a comprehensive list of expert contacts. Based on this list, we believe that we will be able to send the survey to enough people to develop a comprehensive dataset, a step that we anticipate completing in approximately a year from now. We continue to rely mainly on individuals identified by our survey takers and by our own networks for responses. In June 2009 we administered the survey to a large number of experts gathered for a conference on Terrorism and Political Violence hosted by IGCC at the University of California, San Diego. The experts at this conference were from both policy and academic circles and many of them had
spent a great deal of time in the field, interacting with the groups about which we seek information. We were very encouraged by their feedback and anticipate being able to utilize their networks to solicit responses from experts with a wide array of experiences (including those in the policy community).

The sample is at this point too small to report preliminary results.

### 2.3. Terrorism and Prisons in Comparative Perspective (Powell, Lessing)

Ben Lessing conducted field work in Rio de Janeiro in Summer 2009, during which time he met with and interviewed authorities; identified and interviewed ex-members of the Comando Vermelho (CV) and rival drug syndicates / prison gangs; met with the state director of jails and made visits to jails; and submitted formal requests for visitation as well as data from the state penitentiary administration. The latter is known to be uncooperative and Lessing was not able to obtain a visit in his relatively short time in Rio.

Lessing also made formal requests for visitation and data from the Sao Paulo prison administration, and conducted phone interviews with state investigators and other researchers of the PCC. The opportunity to visit jails in Rio took precedence over a field visit to Sao Paulo.

Lessing has reviewed an extensive new ethnographic literature on the PCC that is emerging from a cohort of young researchers in Sao Paulo, and is in close contact with them. Lessing has also been in close contact with Gary Shiffman of CPASS on conceptualizing field findings and translating the work to a form useful for DHS practitioners.

Partial Results: Unlike American prison gangs, Brazilian prison gangs are not formed primarily along racial lines. Prior to the advent of the CV and the PCC, gangs tended to be relatively small, with membership often based on the neighborhood or city from which members hailed, or the specific type of crime they were involved in. The CV and PCC, in contrast, are universal gangs in two related respects: membership in the gangs inner circle is in theory open to anyone (except, perhaps, members of rival factions); and all inmates in a prison dominated by these groups are considered in some sense members. These groups self-consciously identify their constituency as the prison population as a whole. The CV and the PCC, having established hegemony within prison units, proceeded to put in place strong codes of behavior that reduced prison violence and crime. This made these groups essential to the maintenance of order within the prison, necessary partners of prison administrators. Gang leaders have realized this, and have centralized all communication and negotiation with guards and administrators: lesser and non-members are not permitted to interact with officials. Both groups have, at times, used the rhetoric of citizenship and rights to sell themselves as quasi-political organizations. As both groups have become involved in the drug trade outside prison, such rhetoric increasingly rings hollow. However, within prison, these groups continue to make a strong and effective appeal to the prison masses. And indeed, these groups have been effective in winning concessions and reducing abusive behavior by guards.

Lessing’s preliminary research –based on interviews with Brazilian authorities and former members of prison gangs-- suggests that these organizations’ power to recruit, coordinate violent attacks and criminal actions, and ensure the obedience and loyalty of their members comes not in spite of, but paradoxically, because their leadership is imprisoned –by providing a “club” good, protection from violence while incarcerated-- drug-dealing gangs can project influence into neighborhoods in which incarceration is likely for many young men. In ongoing work, we are undertaking a comparative analysis of terrorist organizations activities within prisons, using the catalogue of mechanisms Lessing is developing vis a vis the Brazilian organizations as a framework for comparison and assessment.
In the course of this research an additional parallel has been identified with the way that prison gangs in the U.S. organize. These gangs have drug-distribution connections with organized crime in Mexico and other Latin American countries, making the research relevant for border security.

2.4. Drivers of Militancy (Shapiro)

During this period we fielded a 6,000 person nationally-representative survey in all of Pakistan. The face-to-face survey in Urdu used experimental manipulations to test how support for specific militant organizations varies in response to important dispositional factors such as income, wealth, religiosity, support for democratic values, and political views.

We also conducted an experiment on how changes in respondents’ information about groups’ political claims and about their strategic environment affected responses. These manipulations focused on issues about which respondents were poorly informed and did not try to alter deeply-held beliefs such as the morality of particular causes. Our large sample allowed us to detect regional variation and to identify community characteristics that make it harder or easier to affect patterns of support through experimental manipulation of questions.

To measure the dependent variable (support for militant organizations) we employed an information cue experiment, in which a stance on an orthogonal political question was randomly assigned to a figure associated with a militant group or to a government figure, and then an opinion on the orthogonal question was solicited. This method successfully avoided the high non-response rates encountered in surveys that directly ask Pakistanis about their support for or fear of specific militant groups.

We are just now analyzing the data, but four key findings stand out:

1. Regional variation in support is very large. Support for militant organization is generally lowest in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The implication for Homeland Security is quite striking, as it indicates that these regions host militants despite, rather than because of, popular support! That is consistent with a club model, but inconsistent with the conventional insurgency in a “hearts and minds” model.

2. Personal religiosity does not predict support for any transnational group but does predict lower levels of support for sectarian militias in Pakistan. That is inconsistent with recruiting-based models of radical religious militia activity.

3. The impact of income on support is highly non-linear. The very poor and very wealthy are much more supportive of militant organizations than the middle class. This is again inconsistent with a “hearts and minds” model.

4. Support for core democratic values generally predicts higher levels of support for militant groups but the effect is most pronounced for groups claiming to fight for self-determination, i.e. groups involved in the fight in Kashmir. These findings challenge standard models of the drivers of terrorism.

While we are reluctant to read too much into preliminary results, two things are clear: First, these findings challenge most supply side models of militancy, which view recruiting as a binding constraint on militant activity.

Second, the survey demonstrates a subtle method of eliciting attitudes that does not endanger subject or interviewers and could be widely implemented. If it works in a non-permissive environment such as Baluchistan, one can assume that it could be implemented almost anywhere, including in the U.S.
2.5. Terrorist Risk Factors (Shiffman, Berman)

In our conversations with DHS practitioners we’ve been surprised to find how little of the post 9/11 political science and economics of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is familiar to practitioners. For instance, many researchers have found it useful to treat terrorists as rational consequentialists. Ari Kruglanski of the START center first made this argument convincingly in 2002. Yet the view of the enemy as psychopaths remained common for years and is still disturbingly prevalent, even among experienced practitioners, which could easily lead to screening mistakes at borders if not corrected.

Our general aim in the TRF project is to translate the rapidly developing literature on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency abroad (where most of the data are) into useful methods for protecting Americans. We have two particular aims: first, to supply variables to a risk assessment model that would help predict to what extent individuals attempting to enter the U.S. are a threat; second, to provide officers conducting secondary interviews at border crossings with exposure to tested theories of terrorist organizations, as developed based on conflict data.

This project was launched in the Spring and has already resulted in a short concept paper and an extremely invigorating panel discussion of translatable research, last month in Washington, which included DHS employees, veterans of the intelligence community, academics, members of the defense community and a member of congress who deals regularly with these issues. The discussion included terrorist organizational forms, the potential for modeling risk factors, the potential in enhancing training of border officers with knowledge of academic models, the application of lessons in CT to drug smuggling and human trafficking across borders –with particular attention to inducing leaks and defection, the challenges in improving governance and policing among allies.

We are currently checking on the feasibility of launching a much larger project on TRF, with the aim of producing a book.

3. Applied Relevance

3.1. Rational Peasant Project

a. The “Hearts and Minds” investigation in Iraq has furthered our understanding of the conventional model of COIN. Results so far indicate that most of the violence experienced in Iraq comes from organizations that can be controlled with a classic COIN approach, indicating that they are not the resilient clubs that pose a domestic threat.

That conclusion does not rule out the possibility that there are tight club-like organizations operating in Iraq –indeed suicide attacks continue there. The extent to which these are reduced with benign tactics will indicate the nature of the potential international terrorist threat from Al Qaeda Iraq and other Islamic militants active in Iraq. That threat will become increasingly relevant as U.S. forces withdraw from areas of traditional militant strength.

b. Berman’s newly published book “Radical, Religious and Violent…” provides the first new formal model of terrorism since 9/11 that has been both tested empirically and is written in a style accessible to all practitioners. We hope that it will spark a debate on CT strategy and tactics, both domestic and international, and that such a discussion will lead to improved policies.
While it is not a goal of this research project, we note in passing that the better the general public understand the true extent and nature of threats, the more resilient we will be as a society to those threats, and the less vulnerable we will be to terrorism. That resilience is a form of deterrence.

c. The project completed an NBER working paper titled “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines.” These findings are potentially relevant to the type of program one might design to confront lawlessness and gang activity on the Mexican side of our southern border.

3.2. Expert Survey

The data gathered from the expert survey should be useful for DHS and policy makers as they go forward in developing CT tools. No data currently exists detailing the benign activities of groups, their resource distribution, how they adjudicate disputes within communities, or how to distribute goods and services. The answers to these are crucial to understanding terrorist groups, especially since so many of the most infamous groups and, arguably, most successful groups engage in non-violent activities. Hamas and Hezbollah, for instance, provide welfare, medical care, religious services, and education to their constituent communities. Anecdotal evidence from around the world indicates that many groups, even some of the smallest, attempt to provide some services for communities. Most common seems to be dispute adjudication services whereby a small number of group members, something akin to a local police force, assist community members by solving local level problems. This project represents one of the first attempts to systematically gather data on these sorts of non-violent activities.

The primary relevance of this research is that there are strong links between service delivery and certain types of violence. Namely, attacks from groups that deliver goods and services groups are more lethal attacks and more likely to target civilians (as opposed to military, government or police targets). This project sheds light on an organizational aspect of terrorist groups that has a great deal of influence on the nature of violence on the ground. Furthermore, methods of counterterrorism dedicated to winning hearts and minds must consider what is necessary to win community support, which may entail outcompeting terrorist groups in fulfilling the needs of individuals within communities.

In terms of homeland security the practical relevance of this research will be in identifying the characteristics of organizations which are leakproof enough to operate in the U.S. or in the vicinity of U.S. bases in the non-permissive environments for terrorism.

3.3. Terrorism and Prisons in Comparative Perspective

In general, while poor prison conditions, overcrowding, abuse, and long sentences are harmful to individual criminal actors (whether PCC members or not), they are actually advantageous for prison gangs qua organizations. Once powerful prison gangs exist, there is a strong temptation on the part of administrators to segregate prison by gang affiliation, to reduce prisoner violence. However, segregation can radically strengthen prison gangs by giving them hegemony over an entire facility. In that context, virtually all inmates that pass through such a facility become members of the gang (in some capacity). Segregation also makes it easier for gangs to make credible threats to punish outside members for betrayal or disobedience, since they will be sent to a gang-controlled prison if caught. Thus segregation can contribute to a gang’s ability to project power beyond the prison walls. Mass incarceration policies in the context of prisons dominated by groups like the PCC and CV are at risk of backfiring: swelling the prison population effectively strengthens such groups, and makes governments vulnerable to synchronized riots and other actions.
3.4. Drivers of Militancy

Understanding factors that drive support for Islamist militancy overseas should be a central concern for DHS in predicting risks and profiling individuals. The militant infrastructure (i.e. training camps) of regionally and domestically focused groups operating in Pakistan has repeatedly been used by operatives conducting transnational attacks. Every major Islamist terrorist conspiracy disrupted in the United Kingdom has had links to Pakistan, as did the summer 2007 plot that was disrupted in Germany. Moreover, operatives who have fought in foreign conflicts gain access to small, secure networks than can be used for later attacks. All else equal, more support for extremist militancy abroad translates into more individuals with access to secure networks, which in turn creates a greater threat that terrorist conspiracies will be able to operate undetected in expatriate communities in the United States. Understanding which communities within larger countries pose the greatest risks may help officials determine which expatriate communities in the United States deserve the most attention and outreach.

Our survey identified two sources of substantial sub-national variation in support for militant groups that are highly relevant to homeland security: (1) location of origin in terms of province, in general people in Punjab and Sindh were most supportive of militant groups; and (2) attitude by socioeconomic status, in general middle income Pakistanis were least supportive of groups and high income Pakistanis most supportive. These findings can help officials in the United States determine how the risks from terrorism in expatriate communities vary within larger country-of-origin groups.

Policymakers might consider administering similar surveys within expatriate communities to gauge levels of support for militancy.

3.5. Terrorist Risk Factors

As stated above, the general aim in the TRF project applied relevance --to translate academic insights from the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency abroad (where most of the data are) into useful methods for protecting Americans. Our two particular aims are to inform risk assessment models and to provide useful background for secondary interviewers.

The look forward to future panel discussions with practitioners, legislators and policymakers, which Dr. Shiffman plans to host. The topics of the previous discussion were listed above, and will help guide the research priorities of ourselves and our students in the future. In particular, this researcher was struck by the concern with the U.S. – Mexico border, and how insights from U.S. activity in other poorly governed spaces might translate into policy advice for activity in Mexican border states, which suffer gang-related homicide rates at insurgency levels. In particular, it was interesting to contrast the industrial organization of opium trafficking in Afghanistan --which U.S. forces are become experts on, with that of drug smuggling along the U.S.-Mexico border, which Dr. Shiffman is keenly interested in because of his experience at DHS.

4. Collaborative Projects

4.1. Rational Peasant Project

This project enjoys an informal collaborative relationship with the U.S. Special Forces through the participation of Col. Joseph Felter, who was a Hoover fellow at Stanford University last academic year, and is shortly rotating to a command position in Afghanistan.
4.2. Expert Survey
This project involves scholars from two other academic institutions: David Laitin of Stanford University and Victor Asal of the University at Albany, SUNY. In addition to his faculty position at the University of Albany, Dr. Asal is a researcher at the START center. The project also employed Lindsay Heger, a graduate student researcher at the University of California, San Diego.

4.3. Terrorism and Prisons in Comparative Perspective
This project is led by graduate student Ben Lessing of UC Berkeley, who is advised there by Robert Powell. He has also benefited from several discussions with Dr. Shiffman at CPASS on applications to domestic gang violence issues.

4.4. Drivers of Militancy
The project involved scholars from two other academic institutions: C. Christine Fair of Georgetown University and Neli Malhotra of Stanford University. We worked with a Pakistani survey research firm, Socio-Economic Development Consultants to carry out the survey and employed one graduate research assistant at Princeton University.

4.5. Terrorist Risk Factors
This project is translational, representing a collaboration between all of our researchers and Gary Shiffman at CPASS.

5. Research Products

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<th>Research Products (Please detail below)</th>
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<td>5a # of peer-reviewed journal reports accepted for publication</td>
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5.1. Publications and Reports

CREATE PUBLICATIONS

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<th>Berman, Eli - University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation</th>
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CREATE PUBLICATIONS

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5.2. Presentations - Conferences

4. Berman, E., Symposium on Terrorism, Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, January 2009

5.3. Presentations - Outreach

1. Berman, E., Duke University, Durham, NC, November 2009
2. Berman, E., UCDC office, Washington, DC, November 2009
4. Berman, E., Georgetown University, Washington, DC, November 2009
5. Berman, E., development seminar at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, UCSD, San Diego, CA, October 2009
6. Berman, E., San Jose State University, San José, CA, September 2009
10. Berman, E., University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, April 2009
11. Berman, E., San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, April 2009

6. Education and Outreach Products

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<td># of students involved (funded by CREATE + any other programs)</td>
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6.1. **Rational Peasant Project**  
Liang Choon Wang, Research Assistant, Ph.D. candidate, Economics, UC San Diego  
Tiffany Chou, Research Assistant, Ph.D. candidate, Economics, UC San Diego

6.2. **Expert Survey**  
Lindsay Heger, Research Assistant, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.

6.3. **Terrorism and Prisons in Comparative Perspective**  
Ben Lessing, Researcher, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

6.4. **Drivers of Militancy**  
Graeme Blair, Research Assistant, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics, Princeton  
Robert Fargo, recent undergraduate (Princeton, class of 2009)